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Abstract
In this paper we focus on the theoretical properties of non-numerical representation
of the uncertainty. As usual, this representation is realized by an ‘‘ordinal relation’’ (or,
equivalently, by a ‘‘comparative scale’’) among the ‘‘entities’’ (events, alternatives or
acts) of a specific problem. After giving an overview of dierent known axioms char-
acterizing some classes of ordinal relations (and their duals), we introduce some axioms
to enclose the necessary and sucient conditions for the representability of ordinal
relations (defined on arbitrary finite sets of events) by the most-known uncertainty
measures. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Qualitative representation of uncertainty; Axiomatic frameworks; Partial
ordinal relations
1. Introduction
The qualitative approach to the management of uncertainty is just one of the
dierent tools that a decision maker can adopt, but it is a most general and
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‘‘natural’’ one because it translates the intuitive idea of ordering the events (or
alternatives) in an ‘‘ordinal scale’’. A decision maker is often unable to express
numerical values on the set of relevant events because either he/she just wants
to compare some of them or he/she does not have enough information.
This approach was originally introduced in probability theory with the
notion of comparative probability, sometimes also called qualitative probability
(see for example [3,5,8,12]), but it was also adopted inside other uncertainty
representation settings (like in [7,14,16]). Anyway, all these models have a
common feature: an assessed ordinal relation  on a set of events. A  B
represents the decision maker’s idea that the occurrence of the event B is not
less ‘‘believable’’ than the occurrence of the event A.
Obviously these comparisons cannot be arbitrarily given but must satisfy
some properties. Such properties would reflect rules used (or wanted) by the
decision maker to compose dierent pieces of information, or better, to eval-
uate combinations of events. In other words, the assessed ordinal relation must
‘‘cohere’’ with the way of thinking of the subject.
Since dierent ways of ‘‘managing uncertainty’’ are possible, a variety of
‘‘constraints’’ for the ordinal relation can be given. This aspect is well known in
the numerical approaches, where dierent uncertainty measures (probability,
belief functions, possibility, lower-probability, etc.) are characterized by dif-
ferent ‘‘constraints’’ (usually called ‘‘properties’’ or ‘‘axioms’’). The aim of this
paper is, following the way started in [1,2], to show that such characterization
is also possible in a pure qualitative framework, where, actually, all dierent
ways of composition reduce to few classes of ordinal relations. This result is in
line with the axiomatic qualitative formulation property of being more general
than any numerical approach. In [10] it is well explained how axiomatic
qualitative settings are the ‘‘foundation’’ of any measurement process (and we
deal with the ‘‘measurement’’ of the decision maker’s uncertainty about the
occurrences of the events) since they can ‘‘capture the essence’’ of such process,
independently of any ‘‘scale factor’’ or any ‘‘scale transformation’’. We can
also add now that the ‘‘essence’’ of the dierences among numerical uncer-
tainty measures can be captured by qualitative axioms and that several
‘‘numerical dierences’’ share common fundamental properties.
Since our goal is to express the subject reasoning, it would be sensible to find
axioms of immediate reading. Otherwise it would be essential to give an in-
terpretation (as in the case of comparative probabilities).
The simple requirement of ‘‘agreement’’ with the subject’s idea of compo-
sition is the most natural and fundamental one (even if many others are pro-
posed in the literature, see for example [14, Section 4.5; 15]). However, such
‘‘coherence’’ could be ‘‘strengthened’’ by requiring compatibility of the ordinal
relation with some of the well-known numerical uncertainty measures. This
necessity could derive by the ‘‘wish’’ for either a more ‘‘manageable’’ repre-
sentation of uncertainty or a ‘‘familiar’’ reference point (there is no doubt that
208 A. Capotorti, B. Vantaggi / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 24 (2000) 207–219
numerical approaches have had a greater success and have been widely de-
veloped). Surprisingly in [1,2] it was shown that, apart from comparative
probability, such two ‘‘coherence requirements’’ coincide and that they can be
given with pure qualitative axioms.
While in [1,2] the domain was supposed to be a finite algebra of events and
the strong property of completeness was required, in this paper we deal with
partial ordinal relations defined on arbitrary finite sets of events. In fact, there
is no reason to require to be able to compare all pairs of events, especially if the
available information is ‘‘poor’’. In this general framework we choose as
‘‘coherence principle’’ the possibility of enlarging the initial ordinal relation to
a ‘‘coherent’’ one (complete and defined on a proper algebra). Once again there
could be two dierent kinds of coherence, but in this case, apart from com-
parative probability, we are also able to show that qualitative axioms ensuring
both kinds of coherence can be given.
Hence, the characterization of any kind of ordinal relation  is given by
axioms that must be read as properties that  must satisfy to be compatible
with one particular function.
In Section 2 we give (together with basic notions) an overview of these
axioms when  is complete and defined on an finite algebra of events. On the
other hand, in Section 3, following the ideas given in [3,11], we give the axioms
for partial ordinal relations defined on an arbitrary finite domain. Such axioms
ensure the existence of a coherent complete enlargement  of  (i.e.
A  B) A  B), defined on a proper algebra. It turns out to be equivalent
that  is representable by some special kind of numerical uncertainty function
f, the same compatible with .
2. Axioms on an algebra
As mentioned in Section 1, we must give some constraints to the ordinal
relation  to be consistent with a chosen system of rules to manage uncer-
tainty. These constraints are expressed by axioms that, when  is complete and
defined on an algebra (like in [1,6,7,13,16]), turn out to be the same to ensure
the compatibility of  with at least one of the most-known uncertainty mea-
sures.
In this section we just report axioms and connections with the numerical
framework. For more details refer to [1,2,13,16].
First of all, we formally introduce the notion of an ordinal relation repre-
sentable by a numerical function.
Let  be an ordinal relation between events on a finite algebra A of events
expressing the intuitive idea of being ‘‘no more believable than ’’. The symbols
 and  represent, respectively, the symmetrical and asymmetrical parts of .
A  B means that the occurrence of A is judged ‘‘equally believable’’ to the
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occurrence of B, while A  B represents that the occurrence of B is more
‘‘believed’’ than the occurrence of A (in the sequel we will call  ‘‘strict rela-
tion’’).
A numerical function f : A! 0; 1 represents  if and only if, for every
pair A;B 2A
A  B) f A < f B; A  B) f A  f B: 1
On the other hand, we say that a numerical function f : A! 0; 1 induces an
order relation  by
f A < f B ) A  B; f A  f B ) A  B: 2
In the sequel ‘‘f agrees with ’’ or ‘‘f is compatible with ’’ will be synonymous
with ‘‘f represents and induces, simultaneously, ’’, in other words
A  B () f A6 f B:
The basic requirement for such functions f is to be monotone with respect to ,
hence the induced ordinal relations  must be monotone with respect to .
Therefore, the basic axioms for the compatibility of  are:
(A1)  is a total preorder (reflexive, transitive and defined for all pairs
A;B 2A).
(A2) ;  X (where ; and X are, respectively, the impossible and the sure
events).
(A3) A  B) A  B (monotonicity axiom).
While axioms (A2) and (A3) are quite intuitive, (A1) is reasonable only if the
available information is rich enough to enable the decision maker to compare
all the pairs of events in A.
The previous axioms are the basic requirements, if we want to ‘‘discern’’ the
dierences among ‘‘ways of reasoning’’ we need to introduce more sophisti-
cated properties (always expressed by qualitative axioms).
Historically [5] the first additional requirement was the ‘‘additivity’’ axiom
P 8A;B;C 2A s:t: A ^ C  ;  B ^ C we have
A  B () A _ C  B _ C
(note that (A1), (A2) and (P) imply (A3)).
Axiom (P) looks like the natural qualitative translation of the numerical
property of additivity, but nevertheless it was proved, by an example, in [9]
that, together with (A1) and (A2), it is not sucient to ensure the represent-
ability of  by a probability.
But, as explained in Section 1, the compatibility requirement of  with a
numerical function can be thought as a ‘‘stronger’’ coherence requirement. To
obtain the compatibility of  with a probability an axiom was proposed in [13]
that is not exactly of a qualitative kind because it needs to introduce indicator
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functions. We recall that, denoting by G the set of atoms in A, the indicator
function a : G! f0; 1g associated to the event A 2A is defined as
aG  1 if G  A;
0 otherwise

(where G belongs to the set of atoms G).
We can now report the axiom that can be actually considered as charac-
teristic for any ordinal relation representable by an additive function.
Comparative probability is characterized in [13] by S 8n 2 N 8A1; . . . ;An;
B1; . . . ;Bn 2A s.t. for Bi  Ai i  1; . . . ; nÿ 1 thenXn
i1
ai 
Xn
i1
bi ) An  Bn;
where ai; bi are the indicator functions of Ai;Bi, respectively.
As we noted, axiom (S) does not have a qualitative nature and is not easily
interpretable; however, we think that it is not possible to find a better equiv-
alent formulation.
In the literature relaxed versions of the additivity axiom (P) were proposed.
They turn out to be necessary and sucient conditions for  to be repre-
sentable by more ‘‘specific’’ functions: lower probability, 0-monotone, belief, k-
measure, probability, plausibility, 0-alternating and upper probability.
In the sequel we list some axioms that are characteristic for ordinal relations
defined on an algebra A.
Comparative lower probabilities are characterized in [1] by L 8A;B 2A s.t.
;  A and A ^ B  ; then
B  A _ B:
Comparative belief are characterized in [16] by B 8A;B;C; s.t. A  B and
B ^ C  ; then
A  B) A _ C  B _ C:
The interpretation of axioms (L) and (B) is immediate since they are purely
qualitative and so they can be read directly.
It is easy to observe that axiom (L) is weaker than (i.e. it is implied by)
axiom (B). Note, moreover, that both only involve events with an inclusion
relation and in strict preference between them.
It is possible to associate with each characteristic axiom the set of ordinal
relations satisfying it (together with (A1)–(A3)). We will call these sets
‘‘classes’’ (for example a , satisfying (A1)–(A3) and (B), belongs to the
comparative belief class).
The previous classes agree with dierent uncertainty measures (for a com-
plete overview, see [1,2]) and, in particular, in the following we list each class
together with the classes of numerical functions compatible with it:
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• Comparative lower probabilities are compatible with lower probabilities and
0-monotone functions (the former are defined as lower envelopes of classes
of probabilities, the last, known in the literature also as super-additive, are
those satisfying the property f A _ BP f A  f B for all A;B 2A such
that A ^ B  ;).
• Comparative belief relations are compatible with belief and n-monotone
functions (with n P 2).
• Comparative probabilities are compatible with probabilities and k-measures
with k > ÿ1 (for the definition of k-measures, see [6]).
We can also list the characteristic axioms for what are usually called dual re-
lations, that is, those compatible with plausibility or upper probability, the dual
functions of belief and lower probability, respectively. Note that the axioms
can be checked directly on the relation  given by the decision maker without
using (as done in [4,16]) its dual c defined as
A c B () Bc  Ac:
Comparative plausibilities are characterized in [1] by PL 8A;B;C 2A s.t.
A  B; C ^ B  ; and A  B then
A _ C  B _ C:
Comparative upper probabilities are characterized in [1] by U 8A;B 2A
s.t. ;  A then
B  A _ B:
It is easy to check that axiom (PL) implies (U), moreover both involve only
events, judged equivalent, with inclusion relations. Hence all strict ordinal
relations trivially belong to the comparative plausibility class (so also to the
wider comparative upper probability class).
For the previous classes there is also compatibility with dierent kinds of
numerical functions. In particular:
• Comparative plausibilities are compatible with plausibilities and n-alternat-
ing functions (with n P 2).
• Comparative upper probabilities are compatible with upper probabilities
and 0-alternating functions (the former are the dual functions of lower prob-
abilities, the last ones, known in the literature also as sub-additive, are those
satisfying the property f A _ B6 f A  f B for all A;B 2A such that
A ^ B  ;).
Note that in the qualitative context, contrary to the numerical one, some
properties (like for example additivity and k-additivity) are not distinguishable
because they collapse in the same class of ordinal relations.
As shown in [2,4], this is not the only dierence between the two approaches
because self-dual relations were detected. A self-dual relation  has the
property to coincide with its dual c.
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In the numerical framework the only self-dual functions are probabilities,
while in the qualitative approach, besides comparative probabilities, there is
also a self-dual class of comparative lower–upper probabilities characterized by
the axiom
LU 8A;B 2A then
A  ; () B  A _ B:
Comparative lower–upper probabilities are those representable simultaneously
by two dierent functions: one 0-alternating and an other 0-monotone or,
equivalently, by an upper probability and a dierent lower probability. An
example of such ordinal relation is given in [2]. We report it here too for a
better understanding of the simultaneous compatibility of  with two dierent
kinds of numerical functions.
Example 1. Let E  fA;B;C;Dg be a set of atoms and  an ordinal relation
defined on the power set of E as follows:
;
D
 A
A _ D 
B
B _ D 
C
C _ D 
A _ B
A _ B _ D 
B _ C
B _ C _ D 
A _ C
A _ C _ D
 A _ B _ C
X
(elements in the same group are assessed equivalent).
Using this basic assignment
mA  0:1 mB  0:2 mC  0:3 mD  0
mA _ B  0:1 mA _ C  0:2 mB _ C  0 mA _ B _ C  0:1
mD _ E  0
where E  A _ B _ C
we get a belief function representing 
BelA  0:1 BelB  0:2 BelC  0:3
BelD  0 BelA _ B  0:4 BelA _ C  0:6
BelB _ C  0:5 BelA _ B _ C  1
BelD _ E  BelE
where E  A _ B _ C:
On the other hand, with the following basic assignment:
mA  0:2 mB  0:1 mC  0:3 mD  0
mA _ B  0:05 mA _ C  0 mB _ C  0:2 mA _ B _ C  0:15
mD _ E  0
where E  A _ B _ C;
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we get a plausibility representing 
PlA  0:4 PlB  0:5 PlC  0:65
PlD  0 PlA _ B  0:7 PlA _ C  0:9
PlB _ C  0:8 PlA _ B _ C  1
PlD _ E  PlE
where E  A _ B _ C:
Note that  is not compatible with a probability function, because A  B
and a b c  b a c, but B _ C  A _ C, and this contradicts the
axiom (S).
Moreover, it is easy to check that also the weaker axiom (P) does not hold.
To summarize the previous results, Fig. 1 shows the relationships among the
classes of ordinal relations and the compatible numerical functions, while
Fig. 2 shows the inclusion relationships among the dierent classes (examples
proving the strict inclusions are reported in [1,2]).
3. Axioms on finite sets without structure
In the previous section we characterized dierent (complete) ordinal rela-
tions defined on an algebraA. But, usually, a decision maker is unable, or does
Fig. 1. Relationships among ordinal relations and the numerical functions.
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not want, to express his/her ‘‘comparisons’’ on a so ‘‘rich’’ domain, especially
at the very beginning of the formulation of a problem. On the contrary, he/she
just compares some of the possible combinations among the relevant events.
Hence the axiom (A1) seems to be quite restrictive and the situations where it
can be used would be rare.
Actually, these kinds of relations are interesting because they leave more
freedom to the decision maker and it is important to investigate them.
The aim of this section is similar to the previous one: to detect the most
natural and intuitive qualitative axioms ensuring the compatibility of the
partial ordinal relation with specific rules of uncertainty evaluation.
We can anticipate that, inspired by the most used numerical functions, once
again it is possible to detect which are the basic properties, and how they are
shared, for a dierent way of judging. Surprisingly also in this case, apart from
partial comparative probabilities, such properties, or (better) axioms, can be
given in a pure qualitative setting.
Before formalizing such concepts, it is better to underline that for partial
ordinal relations the ‘‘coherence principles’’ must be given again explicitly. We
choose to ‘‘derive’’ them by the principles given for the complete ordinal re-
lations, but this will be clearer in the sequel.
Given a arbitrary finite set of events F (containing ; and X), let  be a
reflexive binary relation on F satisfying
(A10) there are no intransitive cycles;
(A20) :X  ;;
(A30) for all A;B 2F s.t. A  B then :B  A
(the symbol : means that the subsequent relation does not appear in ).
We call such ordinal relation  ‘‘partial’’ because it could not be defined for
all pairs A;B 2F. It means that the decision maker has not enough infor-
mation to make ‘‘qualitative evaluation’’ for some pairs.
Mathematical properties of ordinal relations satisfying basic axioms
(A10)–(A30) are deeply investigated in [4].
Fig. 2. Relationships among the classes of ordinary relations.
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Note that, since transitivity and monotonicity are natural inferential rules,
starting from  we should build its transitive closure (the smallest transitive
relation w.r.t.  extending ) and work directly with it (as suggested in [4]).
The first ‘‘natural’’ requirement to ask the partial order relation  is to be a
restriction of some complete relation reported in the previous section. This
kind of requirement, besides being ‘‘natural’’, is usual when some ‘‘notion’’ is
only partial (see for example [3,4,14]).
More precisely, starting from a partial ordinal relation  on F, we look for
axioms ensuring the existence of a complete ordinal relation  on AF (the
minimal algebra generated by F) being an enlargement of , or, equivalently,
8A;B 2F
A  B) A  B:
As a consequence of this requirement, a numerical function f represents  if
and only if it is compatible with at least an enlargement  of . Hence the
axioms ensuring the existence of an enlargement for  are actually those en-
suring the existence of a numerical function f representing .
A first result, in this direction, is given in [3], where comparative coherent
probabilities are characterized by the following axiom.
(CP) for any A1; . . . ;An; B1; . . . ;Bn 2F, with Bi  Ai; 8i  1; . . . ; n, such
that for some r1; . . . ; rn > 0
sup
G2G
Xn
i1
riaiG ÿ biG6 0
implies that Ai  Bi, for all i  1; . . . ; n (ai; bi denote the indicator functions of
Ai;Bi, respectively, and the supremum is over the atom’s set).
An ordinal relation satisfying (CP) is representable by a coherent probability
assessment (in the sense of de Finetti [5]); moreover, a coherent probability
assessment on F induces an ordinal relation satisfying (CP) (obviously, the
induced relation will be complete on F).
A similar result is also given for comparative belief in [11]. Before intro-
ducing it we need to define a dierent indicator function a^ : AF ! f0; 1g as-
sociated to the event A 2F as
a^C  1 if C  A;
0 otherwise

(where C belongs to the events of the algebra AF).
The dierence between a^i and ai is that the former is defined for each event
of the algebra AF, while the last is defined on the set of atoms G.
The partial ordinal relation  is representable by a belief function if and
only if the following condition is satisfied:
• for any A1; . . . ;An;B1; . . . ;Bn 2F such that Bi  Ai, 8i  1; . . . ; n and
Bj  Aj, for at least a j, then
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sup
C2AF
Xn
i1
ria^iC ÿ b^iC > 0 8r1; . . . ; rn > 0:
Note that, while axiom (CP) ‘‘translates’’ the axiom (S) in the framework of a
not complete relation, the same is not true for the previous axiom about partial
comparative belief because it ‘‘lost the qualitative nature’’ of axiom (B). Ac-
tually, we can give a dierent axiom for this class of relations without involving
the indicator functions a^i; b^i. This dierent axiom looks like axiom (B). The
idea is that an axiom for must ‘‘avoid’’ violating, even only ‘‘potentially’’, the
corresponding axiom for complete ordinal relations, otherwise it would be
impossible to find a comparative belief enlargement .
Proposition 1. Let  be a partial ordinal relation on F. There exists a com-
parative belief  on AF; such that  is an enlargement of ; if and only if for
all A;B;C 2F s.t. A  B; B ^ C  ; then
B1 A  B) :B _ C  A _ C and
B2 A _ C  B _ C ) :A _ C ^ D  B _ C ^ D 8D 2F.
Proof. Suppose that  is a comparative probability on AF which extends .
Since  satisfies axiom (B), if A  B with A  B, i.e. A  B, then for every C
such that B ^ C  ; the relation A _ C  B _ C holds, so  cannot imply
B _ C  A _ C.
Analogously, suppose A _ C  B _ C, i.e. A _ C  B _ C, the relation
E  Ac ^ B _ E with E ^ Ac ^ B  ; contradicts axiom (B). Therefore, the
relation E  Ac ^ B _ E must hold for every E such that E ^ Ac ^ B  ;. This
implies that  cannot imply A _ C ^ D  B _ C ^ D.
If the transitive closure of  satisfies the axiom B1 and B2, a comparative
belief , which extends , can be built according to axioms B1 and B2 and
the monotonicity one (A30), while the relation between other couples of events
could be chosen freely. 
In the same way, and with similar motivations, we can give the necessary and
sucient axioms for the other classes of relations. The proofs are omitted
because they are similar to that one of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Let  be a partial ordinal relation on F. There exists a com-
parative lower probability  on AF; such that  is an enlargement of ; if and
only if for all A;B 2F s.t. A ^ B  ; then
L1 ;  A) :A _ B  B and
L2 B  A _ B) :;  A.
Note that conditions B1 and B2 imply the conditions characterizing the
comparative lower probabilities L1 and L2.
A. Capotorti, B. Vantaggi / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 24 (2000) 207–219 217
Similarly for the dual relations we have another two couples of characteristic
axioms presented in the following results.
Proposition 3. Let  be a partial ordinal relation on F. There exists a com-
parative plausibility  onAF; such that  is an enlargement of ; if and only if
for all A;B 2F s.t. A  B then
PL1 A  B) :A _ C  B _ C 8C 2F and
PL2 A  B) :B ^ C  A ^ C 8C 2F.
Proposition 4. Let  be a partial ordinal relation on F. There exists a com-
parative upper probability  on AF; such that  is an enlargement of ; if and
only if for all A;B 2F s.t. A ^ B  ; then
U1 ;  A) :C  A _ C 8C 2F and
U2 B  A _ B) :;  A.
In this case too, conditions PL1 and PL2 imply U1 and U2.
Partial self-dual ordinal relations are simply characterized by the axioms
L1, L2, U1 and U2 all together. Unluckily it seems hard to find a shorter
formulation.
All axioms from B1 to U2 are entirely ‘‘qualitative’’, hence they have an
immediate interpretation.
An explicit exposition of the relationships with the numerical functions is
actually redundant because they are implicitly given by the relationships ‘‘en-
capsulated’’ into the potential enlargements , as shown in Fig. 1.
With Propositions 1–4 we complete the spectrum of axioms for the char-
acterization of partial ordinal relations.
The future work will consist in building an inferential system, or, equiva-
lently, to define an operational procedure, to classify a given partial ordinal
relation into one of the classes introduced in this paper.
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